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Garland's claims originated in his attempt, albeit
unsuccessful, to invalidate the Trust and acquire an interest in
the Trust assets. Unlike the Estate of Kincaid case, the
professional fees were incurred by petitioner in a dispute over
title to property between Garland and the Trust. Such expenses
are nondeductible capital expenditures. See secs. 1.212-1(k) and
1.263(a)-2(c), Income Tax Regs.; see also Boagni v. Commissioner,
59 T.C. at 713; Arthur H. DuGrenier, Inc. v. Commissioner, 58
T.C. 931, 938 (1972); Seidler v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 256
(1952); Duntley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-579.
Petitioner bases a second argument for deductibility of her
professional fees on the fact that she incurred the expenses in
her role as Successor Trustee. Petitioner argues that her
fiduciary duty to defend the Trust renders the professional fees
deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses of Trust
administration, citing section 1.212-1(i), Income Tax Regs.
There is no higher or more important duty than defending a trust
against attack, petitioner contends, and thus her legal fees must
be deductible. Respondent counters that, since the legal fees
associated with petitioner's duties of administration originated
in the defense of the Trust, the fees are capital expenditures
under the origin-of-the-claim test.
Section 1.212-1(i), Income Tax Regs., provides:
(i) Reasonable amounts paid or incurred by the
fiduciary of an estate or trust on account of
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