David J. and Jo Dena Johnson - Page 11




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               VASQUEZ, J., concurring:  While I agree with the majority’s             
          conclusion that we lack jurisdiction under section 6330(d) to                
          review the Commissioner’s determination in this case, see Van Es             
          v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 324, 328-329 (2000), I write separately            
          because I disagree with the majority’s discussion of Meyer v.                
          Commissioner, 115 T.C. 417 (2000).                                           
               In Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. ___ (2001) (Lunsford              
          I), which also was released today, the majority undermined the               
          clear language of section 6330 and the will of Congress by                   
          overruling the Court’s holding in Meyer that a taxpayer is                   
          entitled to a section 6330 hearing prior to there being a                    
          determination upon which this Court’s jurisdiction is predicated.            
          In doing so, the majority in Lunsford I concluded that the                   
          hearing statutorily mandated by section 6330(b)(1) is not                    
          required prior to our obtaining jurisdiction.  Contrary to the               
          majority’s opinion in the instant case, Majority op. p. 9, after             
          Lunsford I, there is nothing left in Meyer for the Court to                  
          follow.  Therefore, the majority’s discussion of Meyer and stare             
          decisis is unnecessary.                                                      
               Additionally, I disagree with Judge Beghe’s dissent that we             
          should no longer follow our jurisprudence in Moore v.                        
          Commissioner, 114 T.C. 171 (2000), and Van Es v. Commissioner,               
          115 T.C. 324 (2000).                                                         
          I. Interpreting Section 6330(d)                                              
               First, Judge Beghe suggests that section 6330(d) is                     
          susceptible to the interpretation--indeed, one that he claims is             



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