378
Stevens, J., dissenting
right to effective assistance that prejudice is presumed. When, for instance, counsel is prevented from offering assistance during a critical phase of the proceedings,2 or labors under a conflict of interest that affects her performance,3 then we assume a breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the resulting verdict unreliable. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S., at 658-660. We need not, even if we could, inquire further into the precise nature of the prejudice sustained. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 75-76 (1942). It is enough that the adversarial testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has been thwarted; the result is constitutionally unacceptable, and reversal is automatic. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S., at 656-657; Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475, 489 (1978).4
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), the
Court decided that certain errors by counsel will give rise to a similar presumption of adversarial breakdown. Because the consequences that attend such a presumption—the setting aside of a conviction or sentence—are so serious, the Court took pains to limit the class of errors that would support an ineffective-assistance claim. First, an error must be so egregious that it indicates "deficient performance" by counsel, falling outside the "wide range of reasonable profes-2 See, e. g., Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80 (1976) (attorney-client consultation prevented during overnight recess); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52 (1961) (assistance denied during arraignment).
3 See, e. g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335 (1980) (actual conflict adversely affecting performance constitutes reversible error); Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942) (joint representation of codefendants with inconsistent interests, over objection, constitutes reversible error).
4 "[T]his Court has concluded that the assistance of counsel is among those constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error. Accordingly, when a defendant is deprived of the presence and assistance of his attorney, either throughout the prosecution or during a critical stage in, at least, the prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is automatic." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S., at 489 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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