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Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 15 (1993)

Legal Research Home > United States Supreme Court > 506 U.S. > Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 15 (1993)

378

LOCKHART v. FRETWELL

Stevens, J., dissenting

right to effective assistance that prejudice is presumed. When, for instance, counsel is prevented from offering assistance during a critical phase of the proceedings,² or labors under a conflict of interest that affects her performance,³ then we assume a breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the resulting verdict unreliable. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S., at 658-660. We need not, even if we could, inquire further into the precise nature of the prejudice sustained. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 75-76 (1942). It is enough that the adversarial testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has been thwarted; the result is constitutionally unacceptable, and reversal is automatic. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S., at 656-657; Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475, 489 (1978).⁴

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), the

Court decided that certain errors by counsel will give rise to a similar presumption of adversarial breakdown. Because the consequences that attend such a presumption—the setting aside of a conviction or sentence—are so serious, the Court took pains to limit the class of errors that would support an ineffective-assistance claim. First, an error must be so egregious that it indicates "deficient performance" by counsel, falling outside the "wide range of reasonable profes-² See, e. g., Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80 (1976) (attorney-client consultation prevented during overnight recess); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52 (1961) (assistance denied during arraignment).

³ See, e. g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335 (1980) (actual conflict adversely affecting performance constitutes reversible error); Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942) (joint representation of codefendants with inconsistent interests, over objection, constitutes reversible error).

⁴ "[T]his Court has concluded that the assistance of counsel is among those constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error. Accordingly, when a defendant is deprived of the presence and assistance of his attorney, either throughout the prosecution or during a critical stage in, at least, the prosecution of a capital offense, reversal is automatic." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S., at 489 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Last modified: October 4, 2007