Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 20 (1993)

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Cite as: 506 U. S. 364 (1993)

Stevens, J., dissenting

paradigmatic example of the "lawlessness" to which Strickland referred, in the suggestion that perjured testimony might have undermined the decisionmaker's judgment, and concluded quite correctly that the defendant could not rely on any outcome-determinative effects of perjury to make his claim. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S., at 175; see also id., at 186 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). I do not read the Court's decision today as suggesting that a state trial court need fear the label "lawless" if it follows the decision of a United States Court of Appeals on a matter of federal constitutional law. Accordingly, Nix's discussion of perjury and lawlessness is simply inapposite to the issues presented here.

II

It is not disputed in this case that the performance of respondent's counsel was so deficient that it met the Strickland standard. What deserves emphasis here is the proven connection between that deficiency and the outcome of respondent's sentencing proceeding, as well as the presumptive effect of counsel's performance on the adversarial process itself.

Respondent was convicted of committing murder in the course of a robbery. The Arkansas trial court then held a separate sentencing hearing, devoted exclusively to the question whether respondent was eligible for the death penalty, or would instead receive a life sentence without parole. The State relied on two aggravating circumstances to establish its right to execute respondent. The first—the alleged purpose of avoiding arrest—was found by the jury to be unsupported by the evidence. The second—that the felony was committed for purposes of pecuniary gain—was obviously supported by the evidence, as respondent had already been convicted of robbery in connection with the murder. Thus, the critical question on which respondent's death eligibility turned was whether it was permissible, as a matter of law, to "double count" by relying on pecuniary gain as an

383

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