Cite as: 506 U. S. 364 (1993)
Stevens, J., dissenting
Court's duty to administer justice impartially. Elementary fairness dictates that the Court should evaluate respondent's ineffective-assistance claim under the law as it stood when he was convicted and sentenced—under Collins, and also under Strickland as it was understood until today.
As I see it, the only windfall at issue here is the one conferred upon the State by the Court's decision. Had respondent's counsel rendered effective assistance, the State would have been required to justify respondent's execution under a legal regime that included Collins. It is highly unlikely that it could have met this burden in the Arkansas courts, see supra, at 384-385, and it almost certainly could not have done so in the federal courts on habeas review. Now, however, the State is permitted to exploit the ineffective assistance of respondent's counsel, and the lapse in time it provided, by capitalizing on postsentencing changes in the law to justify an execution. Because this windfall is one the Sixth Amendment prevents us from bestowing, I respectfully dissent.
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