Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 22 (1994)

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Cite as: 511 U. S. 738 (1994)

Blackmun, J., dissenting

an uncounseled conviction is reliable enough for Sixth Amendment purposes to justify the imposition of imprisonment, even in the sentencing context. Nor does it follow that, because the state may attempt to prove at sentencing conduct justifying greater punishment, it also may rely on a prior uncounseled conviction. In McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U. S. 79 (1986), for example, the State was permitted to prove at sentencing that the defendant visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of the felonies of which he was convicted.3 Where, as in McMillan, the state sets out

additional punishment than otherwise authorized, McMillan, 477 U. S., at 88, while the prior conviction at issue here exposed petitioner to two additional years in prison.

Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U. S. 476 (1993), in which the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a state statute that enhanced a penalty based on the defendant's motive, is no more helpful to the majority's position. The Court simply observed that the defendant's motive was a factor traditionally considered by sentencing judges; it said nothing about the validity of prior convictions or even about the standard required to prove the motive. Similarly, although United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443, 446 (1972), made passing reference to a sentencing judge's broad inquiry, it held only that Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), required re-sentencing where the sentencing court had considered prior felony convictions that later were found to have been uncounseled.

Finally, Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949), was a Confrontation Clause challenge to a sentencing judge's consideration of evidence obtained through a presentence investigation. The court did not rely on any prior convictions; the defendant, who was represented by counsel, did not challenge the accuracy of the information the judge considered, ask the judge to disregard it, or seek to refute or discredit it; and the consideration of this information did not expose the defendant to a greater or additional punishment.

3 McMillan, of course, was a due process case. Curiously, the Court appears to rest its holding as much on the Due Process Clause as on the Sixth Amendment. See ante, at 748. But even if the use of a prior un-counseled conviction does not violate due process, that does not conclusively resolve the Sixth Amendment question. Compare Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 462 (1942) (holding that the right to counsel was not required under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and recognizing due process as a "concept less rigid and more fluid than those envis-

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