Cite as: 511 U. S. 738 (1994)
Blackmun, J., dissenting
represents the seriousness of a defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that a defendant will commit further crimes." United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3 (Nov. 1993). Realistically, then, the conclusion that a state may prove prior conduct in a sentencing proceeding at which the defendant is aided by counsel does not support, much less compel, a conclusion that the state may, in lieu of proving directly the prior conduct, rely on a conviction obtained against an uncounseled defendant.4
4 Justice Souter concludes that this provision passes Sixth Amendment muster by providing the defendant a "reasonable opportunity" to disprove the accuracy of the prior conviction. Ante, at 753. Even assuming that the Guidelines would permit a sentencing court to depart downward in response to a defendant's claim that his conviction resulted from his lack of sophistication or his calculation that it was cheaper to plead and pay a low fine than to retain counsel and litigate the charge, such a safety valve still does not accommodate reliability concerns sufficiently. As Chief Justice Burger recognized in Argersinger, "[a]ppeal from a conviction after an uncounseled trial is not likely to be of much help to a defendant since the die is usually cast when judgment is entered on an uncounseled trial record." 407 U. S., at 41 (concurring opinion). A collateral proceeding holds forth no greater promise of relief. The uncounseled misdemeanor convictions that are considered inherently unreliable under Argersinger and Scott are presumptively valid under most sentence enhancement schemes, see, e. g., Custis v. United States, ante, p. 485 (limiting a defendant's right to attack as unconstitutional a prior conviction used to enhance a sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)); Parke v. Raley, 506 U. S. 20 (1992) (presumption of validity that attaches to final judgments properly extended to prior convictions used for sentence enhancement under a state recidivism statute), and are presumptively reflected in a defendant's criminal history score—and sentence—under the Guidelines, see United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual App. C, amdt. 353 (Nov. 1993) ("Prior sentences, not otherwise excluded, are to be counted in the criminal history score, including uncounseled misdemeanor sentences where imprisonment was not imposed").
Moreover, although it might be salutary for courts to consider under the Guidelines a defendant's reasons other than culpability for pleading nolo contendere to a prior misdemeanor conviction, I do not share Justice
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