258
Opinion of Stevens, J.
Petitioner also has called our attention to the instruction which told the jury that it was not necessary for the Government to prove that petitioner knew that the item "was a 'firearm' which the law requires to be registered." Ibid. Given the fact that the jurors had previously been told that a conviction requires that they find that petitioner knew the item was a silencer, this instruction is best read as merely explaining that a conviction did not require the jury to find that the defendant knew that the law required registration of the silencer. Under our decision in Freed, the Government was entitled to such an instruction.
We assume that the trial judge would have been more explicit in explaining the mens rea element of these offenses if Staples had been decided prior to submitting the case to the jury. However, in this case, we are satisfied that the instructions as given did inform the jurors that they must find that the defendant knew that the silencer was in fact a si-knowledge that it's a firearm. The second says it is. It has firearm in quotes.
. . . . . "THE COURT: Your client has gotten on the stand and testified that he knew instantly that that silencer was a silencer . . . . We could take that sentence out of there.
"MR. SALANTRIE: He didn't say he knew it should be registered." Id., at 87 (emphasis added).
Thus, the trial judge explicitly interpreted the instruction as satisfying the defense counsel's objection concerning the requirement that the defendant have knowledge of the offending characteristics of the firearm. The defense counsel, whose objection continually shifted between arguing that the defendant must know the offending characteristics of the firearm and that the defendant must know that the law requires the firearm to be registered, also agreed that the instruction "required for him to have knowledge that it's a firearm." Ibid. Ultimately, he merely argued that "the first sentence"—pertaining to knowledge of the registration requirement—was inconsistent with the requirement that the jury find that the defendant have knowledge of the offending characteristics of the firearm. Ibid.
6 Id., at 105. In a footnote, the Court of Appeals noted that although the reasoning in Staples only involved § 5861(d), it logically applied equally to § 5861(i). 94 F. 3d, at 1524, n. 8.
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