Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 22 (1998)

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Cite as: 522 U. S. 398 (1998)

Stevens, J., dissenting

The mere fact that a false denial fits within the unqualified language of 18 U. S. C. § 1001 is not, in my opinion, a sufficient reason for rejecting a well-settled interpretation of that statute. It is not at all unusual for this Court to conclude that the literal text of a criminal statute is broader than the coverage intended by Congress. See, e. g., Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600, 605, 619 (1994); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64, 68-69 (1994) (departing from "most natural grammatical reading" of statute because of "anomalies which result from this construction," and presumptions with respect to scienter in criminal statutes and avoiding constitutional questions); id., at 81 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that lower court interpretation of statute rejected by the Court was "quite obviously the only grammatical reading"); Williams v. United States, 458 U. S. 279, 286 (1982) (holding that statute prohibiting the making of false statements to a bank was inapplicable to depositing of a "bad check" because "the Government's interpretation . . . would make a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable conduct a violation of federal law"); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 448 (1932) ("We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in enacting [a Prohibition Act] statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish them"); United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631 (1818) (opinion of Marshall, C. J.) (holding that although "words 'any person or persons,' [in maritime robbery statute] are broad enough to comprehend every human being[,] . . . general words must not only be limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the state, but also to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them"). Although the text of § 1001, read literally, makes it a crime for an undercover narcotics agent to make a false statement to a drug peddler, I am confident

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