42
Souter, J., dissenting
provision applied and the plurality rule remained the rule under the code. Rome argued, however, that the default provision should be applied so as effectively to validate an unprecleared 1966 municipal charter change to an express majority requirement. This Court rejected the argument in these words:
"We also reject the appellants' argument that the majority vote, runoff election, and numbered posts provisions of the city's charter have already been precleared by the Attorney General because in 1968 the State of Georgia submitted, and the Attorney General precleared, a comprehensive Municipal Election Code that is now Title 34A of the Code of Georgia. Both the relevant regulation, 28 CFR § 51.10 (1979), and the decisions of this Court require that the jurisdiction 'in some unambiguous and recordable manner submit any legislation or regulation in question directly to the Attorney General with a request for his consideration pursuant to the Act,' Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 571 (1969), and that the Attorney General be afforded an adequate opportunity to determine the purpose of the electoral changes and whether they will adversely affect minority voting in that jurisdiction, see United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Ala., 435 U. S. 110, 137-138 (1978). Under this standard, the State's 1968 submission cannot be viewed as a submission of the city's 1966 electoral changes, for, as the District Court noted, the State's submission informed the Attorney General only of 'its decision to defer to local charters and ordinances regarding majority voting, runoff elections, and numbered posts,' and 'did not . . . submit in an "unambiguous and recordable manner" all municipal charter provisions, as written in 1968 or as amended thereafter, regarding these issues.' 472 F. Supp. 221, 233 (DC 1979)." 446 U. S., at 169-170, n. 6.
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