Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 5 (2000)

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104

KIMEL v. FLORIDA BD. OF REGENTS

Opinion of Thomas, J.

there were no ADEA suits against States that could be affected by § 255(d)'s tolling provision. If Congress had recognized this "overinclusiveness" problem, it likely would have amended § 626(e) to incorporate only §§ 255(a)-(c). Cf. § 626(b) (incorporating "the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sectio[n] . . . 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof ") (emphasis added)). But since Congress did not do so, we are left to conclude that Congress did not clearly focus on the impact of § 6(d)(2)(A) on the ADEA. And Congress' insouciance with respect to the impact of § 6(d)(2)(A) suggests that Congress was similarly inattentive to the impact of § 6(d)(1).

Insofar as § 6(d)(2)(A) is closer to § 6(d)(1) in terms of space and purpose than is § 28, the implication I would draw from § 6(d)(2)(A) almost certainly outweighs the inference the Court would draw from § 28. In any event, the notion that § 28 of the 1974 Amendments evidences Congress' awareness of every last ripple those amendments might cause in the ADEA is at best a permissible inference, not "the unequivocal declaration which . . . is necessary before we will determine that Congress intended to exercise its powers of abrogation." Dellmuth, 491 U. S., at 232.

The Court advances a more general critique of my approach, explaining that "we have never held that Congress must speak with different gradations of clarity depending on the specific circumstances of the relevant legislation . . . ." Ante, at 76. But that descriptive observation, with which I agree, is hardly probative in light of the fact that a "clear statement by incorporation" argument has not to date been presented to this Court. I acknowledge that our previous cases have not required a clear statement to appear within a single section or subsection of an Act. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44 (1996); see also id., at 56-57 (confirming clear statement in one statutory subsection by looking to provisions in other

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