Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 9 (2000)

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Cite as: 528 U. S. 377 (2000)

Opinion of the Court

a genuine issue of material fact about the State's alleged interest in limiting campaign contributions. Ibid.2

Given the large number of States that limit political contributions, see generally Federal Election Commission, E. Feigenbaum & J. Palmer, Campaign Finance Law 98 (1998), we granted certiorari to review the congruence of the Eighth Circuit's decision with Buckley. 525 U. S. 1121 (1999). We reverse.

II

The matters raised in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), included claims that federal campaign finance legislation infringed speech and association protections of the First Amendment and the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 3, as amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263, limited (and still limits) contributions by individuals to any single candidate for federal office to $1,000 per election. 18 U. S. C. §§ 608(b)(1), (3) (1970 ed., Supp. IV); Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 13. Until Buckley struck it down, the law also placed a $1,000 annual ceiling on independent expenditures linked to specific candidates. 18 U. S. C. § 608(e) (1970 ed., Supp. IV); 424 U. S., at 13. We found violations of the First Amendment in the expenditure regulations, but held the contribution restrictions constitutional. Buckley v. Valeo, supra.

2 Chief Judge Bowman also would have found the law invalid because the contribution limits were severely tailored beyond any need to serve the State's interest. Comparing the Missouri limits with those considered in Buckley, the Chief Judge said that "[a]fter inflation, limits of $1,075, $525, and $275 cannot compare with the $1,000 limit approved in Buckley twenty-two years ago," and "can only be regarded as 'too low to allow meaningful participation in protected political speech and association.' " 161 F. 3d, at 522-523 (quoting Day v. Holahan, 34 F. 3d 1356, 1366 (CA8 1994), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 1127 (1995)). Judge Ross, concurring in the judgment, did not join this portion of Chief Judge Bowman's opinion. 161 F. 3d, at 523.

Judge Gibson dissented from the panel's decision. Ibid.

385

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