Pollard v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 4 (2001)

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846

POLLARD v. E. I. du PONT de NEMOURS & CO.

Opinion of the Court

The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the record demonstrated that DuPont employees engaged in flagrant discrimination based on sex and that DuPont managers and supervisors did not take adequate steps to stop it. 213 F. 3d 933 (CA6 2000).

The issue presented for review here is whether front pay constitutes an element of "compensatory damages" under 42 U. S. C. § 1981a and thus is subject to the statutory damages cap imposed by that section. Although courts have defined "front pay" in numerous ways, front pay is simply money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement. For instance, when an appropriate position for the plaintiff is not immediately available without displacing an incumbent employee, courts have ordered reinstatement upon the opening of such a position and have ordered front pay to be paid until reinstatement occurs. See, e. g., Walsdorf v. Board of Comm'rs, 857 F. 2d 1047, 1053-1054 (CA5 1988); King v. Staley, 849 F. 2d 1143, 1145 (CA8 1988). In cases in which reinstatement is not viable because of continuing hostility between the plaintiff and the employer or its workers, or because of psychological injuries suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the discrimination, courts have ordered front pay as a substitute for reinstatement. See, e. g., Gotthardt v. National R. R. Passenger Corp., 191 F. 3d 1148, 1156 (CA9 1999); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F. 2d 945, 957 (CA10 1980). For the purposes of this opinion, it is not necessary for us to explain when front pay is an appropriate remedy. The question before us is only whether front pay, if found to be appropriate, is an element of compensatory damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and thus subject to the Act's statutory cap on such damages.

Here, the District Court observed that "the $300,000.00 award is, in fact, insufficient to compensate plaintiff," 16 F. Supp. 2d 913, 924, n. 19 (WD Tenn. 1998), but it stated that

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