Pollard v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 9 (2001)

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Cite as: 532 U. S. 843 (2001)

Opinion of the Court

under § 706(g).1 In fact, no court of appeals appears to have ever held to the contrary.2

In 1991, without amending § 706(g), Congress further expanded the remedies available in cases of intentional employment discrimination to include compensatory and punitive damages. See 42 U. S. C. § 1981a(a)(1). At that time, Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, permitted the recovery of unlimited compensatory and punitive damages in cases of intentional race and ethnic discrimination, but no similar remedy existed in cases of intentional sex, religious, or disability discrimination. Thus, § 1981a brought all forms of intentional employment discrimination into alignment, at least with respect to the forms of relief available to successful plaintiffs. However, compensatory and punitive damages awarded under § 1981a may not exceed the statutory limitations set forth in § 1981a(b)(3), while such damages awarded under § 1981 are not limited by statute.

1 See, e. g., Barbano v. Madison Cty., 922 F. 2d 139, 146-147 (CA2 1990); Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F. 2d 367, 383 (CA3 1987); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F. 2d 257, 269 (CA4 1976); Walsdorf v. Board of Comm'rs, 857 F. 2d 1047, 1054 (CA5 1988); Shore v. Federal Express Corp., 777 F. 2d 1155, 1159-1160 (CA6 1985); Briseno v. Central Technical Community College Area, 739 F. 2d 344, 348 (CA8 1984); Thorne v. El Segundo, 802 F. 2d 1131, 1137 (CA9 1986); Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F. 2d 945, 957 (CA10 1980); Nord v. United States Steel Corp., 758 F. 2d 1462, 1473-1474 (CA11 1985); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F. 2d 257, 292 (CADC 1982). See also McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F. 2d 104, 116-117 (CA7 1990) (reserving question of availability of front pay under Title VII); Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F. 2d 605, 615-616 (CA1 1985) (holding that front pay is available under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, but relying on Title VII case law).

2 The only two Courts of Appeals not to have addressed this issue prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 have since joined the other Circuits in holding that front pay is a remedy available under § 706(g). See Selgas v. American Airlines, Inc., 104 F. 3d 9, 12-13 (CA1 1997); Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F. 3d 944, 951-952 (CA7 1998).

851

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