Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 18 (2004)

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Cite as: 540 U. S. 614 (2004)

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.' " TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001)). The Court's reading of § 552a(g)(4) is hardly in full harmony with that principle. Under the Court's construction, the words "a person entitled to recovery" have no office, see ante, at 623, n. 8, and the liability-determining element "adverse effect" becomes superfluous, swallowed up by the "actual damages" requirement.1 Further, the Court's interpretation renders the word "recovery" nothing more than a synonym for "actual damages," and it turns the phrase "shall be liable" into "may be liable." In part because it fails to " 'give effect . . . to every clause and word' " Congress wrote, United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152 (1883)), the Court's reading of § 552a(g)(4) is at odds with the interpretation prevailing in the Federal Circuits.

I would adhere to the interpretation of the key statutory terms advanced by most courts of appeals. As interpreted by those courts, § 552a(g)(4) authorizes a minimum $1,000 award that need not be hinged to proof of actual damages. See Orekoya v. Mooney, 330 F. 3d 1, 5 (CA1 2003) (§ 552a(g)(4) makes available "[b]oth 'actual damages sustained by the individual' and statutory minimum damages of $1,000"); Wilborn v. Department of Health and Human

1 The Court interprets "the reference in § 552a(g)(1)(D) to 'adverse effect' . . . as a term of art identifying a potential plaintiff who satisfies the injury-in-fact and causation requirements of Article III standing, and who may consequently bring a civil action without suffering dismissal for want of standing to sue." Ante, at 624. Under the Court's reading, § 552a(g)(1)(D) "open[s] the courthouse door" to individuals "adversely affected" by an intentional or willful agency violation of the Privacy Act, ante, at 624-625, while § 552a(g)(4) bars those individuals from recovering anything if they do not additionally show actual damages. See infra, at 635-636. In other words, the open door for plaintiffs like Buck Doe is an illusion: what one hand opens, the other shuts.

631

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