Appeal No. 97-4042
Application 08/578,248
the provisions of 37 CFR § 1.196(b), we will enter new
rejections of claims 13, 15 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Our
reasons for these determinations follow.
Considering first the rejection of claims 1 and 9 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b), we initially note that the terminology in
a pending application's claims is to be given its broadest
reasonable interpretation (In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13
USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989)) and limitations from a
pending application's specification will not be read into the
claims (Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1581-82, 6 USPQ2d
2020, 2027 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Moreover, anticipation by a
prior art reference does not require either the inventive
concept of the claimed subject matter or the recognition of
inherent properties that may be possessed by the prior art
reference. See Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 814
F.2d 628, 633, 2 USPQ2d 1051, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 827 (1987). A prior art reference
anticipates the subject matter of a claim when that reference
discloses every feature of the claimed invention, either
explicitly or inherently (Hazani v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 126
4
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