Ex parte HOLLATZ et al. - Page 8




          Appeal No. 1997-3181                                                        
          Application No. 08/304,345                                                  

               We are not inclined to dispense with proof by evidence                 
          when the proposition at issue is not supported by a teaching                
          in a prior art reference or shown to be common knowledge of                 
          unquestionable demonstration.  Our reviewing court requires                 
          this evidence in order to establish a prima facie case.  In re              
          Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1471-72, 223 USPQ 785, 787-88 (Fed.                
          Cir. 1984); In re Knapp-Monarch Co., 296 F.2d 230, 232, 132                 
          USPQ 6, 8 (CCPA 1961); In re Cofer, 354 F.2d 664, 668, 148                  
          USPQ 268, 271-72 (CCPA 1966).      Furthermore, our reviewing               
          court states in In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ               
          785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984) the following:                                    
               The Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383                     
               U.S. 1 (1966), focused on the procedural and evidentiary               
               processes in reaching a conclusion under Section 103.  As              
               adapted to ex parte procedure, Graham is interpreted as                
               continuing to place the "burden of proof on the Patent                 
               Office which requires it to produce the factual basis for              
               its rejection of an application under section 102 and                  
          103."     Citing In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1020, 154 USPQ                
          173, 177       (CCPA 1967).                                                 
               After a review of the teachings in Kohler, although we                 
          find that only available agents are searched for a particular               
          skill, we fail to find skill groups of available agents with a              
          common agent-skill indicator as recited in Appellants' claim                
          1.  We disagree with the Examiner that Appellants' claimed                  
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