Ex parte HSU - Page 7




               Appeal No. 1999-0700                                                                          Page 7                 
               Application No. 08/590,580                                                                                           


                       The Patent and Trademark Office applies to the verbiage of the claims the broadest                           
               reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one                           
               of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or                    
               otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant's                               
               specification.  In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997).                            
               Moreover, an applicant can be his own lexicographer provided the applicant's definition, to the                      
               extent it differs from the conventional definition, is clearly set forth in the specification.                       
               Beachcombers Int’l, Inc. v. Wild Wood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1158, 31 USPQ2d                           

               1653, 1656 (Fed. Cir. 1994).                                                                                         
                       In the instant case, as discussed above, the definition of "recycled fiber sludge" is                        
               clearly set forth in the appellant's specification and the examiner has erred in refusing to apply                   
               this definition in interpreting the claim language.  As the standing 35 U.S.C. § 102 rejection of                    
               claims 1-4, 6-8 and 10-23 rests in part on the examiner's interpretation of "recycled fiber                          
               sludge" as including sludge from waste water derived from any paper manufacturing process,                           
               we are constrained to reverse this rejection.                                                                        
                                                   The obviousness rejections                                                       
                       Rejections based on 35 U.S.C. § 103 must rest on a factual basis.  In making such a rejection,               

               the examiner has the initial duty of supplying the requisite factual basis and may not, because of doubts            

               that the invention is patentable, resort to speculation, unfounded assumptions or hindsight reconstruction           








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