Cite as: 516 U. S. 124 (1995)
Kennedy, J., concurring
There is no express indication in § 1452 that Congress intended that statute to be the exclusive provision governing removals and remands in bankruptcy. Nor is there any reason to infer from § 1447(d) that Congress intended to exclude bankruptcy cases from its coverage. The fact that § 1452 contains its own provision governing certain types of remands in bankruptcy, see § 1452(b) (authorizing remand on "any equitable ground" and precluding appellate review of any decision to remand or not to remand on this basis), does not change our conclusion. There is no reason §§ 1447(d) and 1452 cannot comfortably coexist in the bankruptcy context. We must, therefore, give effect to both. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253 (1992).
If an order remands a bankruptcy case to state court because of a timely raised defect in removal procedure or lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, then a court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to review that order under § 1447(d), regardless of whether the case was removed under § 1441(a) or § 1452(a). The remand at issue falls squarely within § 1447(d), and the order is not reviewable on appeal.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion but write to point out that Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U. S. 336 (1976), has itself been limited by our later decision in Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U. S. 343 (1988). As I understand the opinion we issue today, our reliance on Thermtron to hold that 28 U. S. C. § 1447(d) prohibits appellate review of this remand pursuant to § 1447(c) (whether or not removal was effected pursuant to § 1441(a) or § 1452(a)) is not intended to bear upon the reviewability of Cohill orders.
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