Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 11 (1995)

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134

THINGS REMEMBERED, INC. v. PETRARCA

Ginsburg, J., concurring

cally equitable claims in forfeiture challenges") (emphasis in original).

It seems to me entirely appropriate—and, in that sense, equitable—to remand a case for failure promptly to remove. Indeed, counsel for petitioner recognized the potential for manipulation inherent in his proffered distinction between statutory time limits ("legal" limits) on the one hand and, on the other, court-made determinations that a procedural move is untimely because pursued without due expedition ("equitable" assessments). At oral argument, the following exchange occurred:

"QUESTION: Suppose the judge in this case said, I'm not 100 percent sure about strict time limit, but I think you should have come here sooner, so for equitable reasons I'm remanding this because I think you dawdled— an equitable notion like laches . . .—that would not be reviewable, right?

"MR. CUNDRA: That is correct. "QUESTION: So it's the judge's label, what he wants to put on it. He can make it immune from review if he says, laches.

"MR. CUNDRA: Yes. "QUESTION: But it's reviewable if he says, time bar under the statute.

"MR. CUNDRA: Yes." Tr. of Oral Arg. 15-16.

As Circuit Judge Gee remarked in relation to this very issue, it "make[s] little sense" to rest reviewability vel non on the tag the trial court elects to place on its ruling. Sykes v. Texas Air Corp., 834 F. 2d 488, 492 (CA5 1987).

Interpreting § 1452(b) as fully in sync with § 1447(d) on the nonreviewability of remand orders, we stress, secures the uniform treatment of all remands, regardless of the party initiating the removal or the court from which the case is removed. Cf. Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F. 2d 984, 991-992

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