136
Ginsburg, J., concurring
to proceeding with the case though all the legal requirements are met), by authorizing remands as fairness warrants, i. e., when a remand would be "equitable."
In sum, a "strong congressional policy against review of remand orders," Sykes, 834 F. 2d, at 490, underlies §§ 1447(d) and 1452(b). Courts serve the legislature's purpose best by reading § 1452(b) to make sense and avoid nonsense, and to fit harmoniously within a set of provisions composing a coherent chapter of the Judicial Procedure part of the United States Code. Cf. United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988) (statutory term "that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme," for example, when "only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law") (citations omitted). Thus the Sixth Circuit, I conclude, correctly ruled that neither § 1452(b) nor § 1447(d) permits the assertion of appellate jurisdiction in this case.
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