Your Home Visiting Nurse Services, Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449, 9 (1999)

Page:   Index   Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  Next

Cite as: 525 U. S. 449 (1999)

Opinion of the Court

mandamus relief because it has not shown the existence of a "clear nondiscretionary duty," id., at 616, to reopen the reimbursement determination at issue. The reopening regulations do not require reopening, but merely permit it: "A determination of an intermediary . . . may be reopened . . . by such intermediary . . . on the motion of the provider affected by such determination," 42 CFR § 405.1885(a) (1997) (emphasis added). To be sure, the Secretary's Medicare Reimbursement Provider Manual § 2931.2 (Feb. 1985) does provide that "[w]hether or not the intermediary will reopen a determination, otherwise final, will depend upon whether (1) new and material evidence has been submitted, or (2) a clear and obvious error was made, or (3) the determination is found to be inconsistent with the law, regulations and rulings, or general instructions." But we hardly think that this disjunctive listing of factors was meant to convert a discretionary function into a mandatory one. As to factor (1), for example, it seems to us inconceivable that the existence of new and material evidence would alone require reopening, no matter how unpersuasive that evidence might be. The present case, we might note, involves evidence that was already before the intermediary at the time of its decision. The holding of ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, supra, that the decision whether to reopen, at least where no new evidence is at issue, is " 'committed to agency discretion by law' " within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, and hence unreviewable, see id., at 282, is squarely applicable.

The last point alone would suffice to defeat petitioner's suggestion that we grant it the relief it requests under the judicial-review provision of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706. In addition, however, we have long held that this provision is not an independent grant of

self. We have avoided deciding this issue in the past, see, e. g., Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602, 616-617 (1984), and we again find it unnecessary to reach it today.

457

Page:   Index   Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007