Ex Parte SATOH et al - Page 9




              Appeal No. 2001-2200                                                                                         
              Application No. 09/286,328                                                                                   

              formed by laminating an aluminum-copper alloy film and a copper film.  (See Brief at 8.)                     
              We do not sustain the rejection of claims 37-39.                                                             
                     Finally, we observe that independent claims 41 and 42 fail to require the subject                     
              matter taught as essential to the invention.  We also note that appellants have not                          
              grouped the claims with any of the arguments submitted in response to the section 112,                       
              first paragraph rejection.  We sustain the rejection of claims 41 and 42.                                    
                     Thus, with respect to the rejection of the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first                        
              paragraph for lack of an enabling disclosure, we sustain the rejection of claims 8, 10-                      
              13, 20, 22-25, 27-33, 40-42, 44, and 45; we do not sustain the rejection of claims 9, 21,                    
              26, 34-39, and 43.                                                                                           


                     Section 102 rejection                                                                                 
                     The examiner has rejected claims 34-36 and 43-45 as being "clearly anticipated"                       
              by appellants' admitted prior art, as shown in Figure 1 of the '917 patent.  Appellants'                     
              position is that the process limitations in the product claims serve to distinguish over the                 
              admitted prior art.                                                                                          
                     Process steps per se cannot serve to limit product claims.  See In re Stephens,                       
              345 F.2d 1020, 1023, 145 USPQ 656, 658 (CCPA 1965) (“We think it well settled that                           
              the presence of process limitations in product claims, which product does not otherwise                      
              patentably distinguish over the prior art, cannot impart patentability to that product.”).                   
              The relevant inquiry is how the process recitations might define structure.  See, e.g., In                   
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