Appeal No. 95-3175
Application 08/124,361
Webb does not disclose (1) "automatically inputting information" from a mileage sensor of the
vehicle, and (2) "a calibration system operable to calibrate the computerized information processing system
with an odometer of the vehicle."
Fogg and Whitaker do not disclose (1) a "menu-driven input," (2) recording "vehicle operating
expenses," (3) recording "non-vehicular information including travel expenses," and (4) "transfer circuitry."
Gulas does not disclose (1) "menu-driven input," (2) recording "non-vehicular information including
travel expenses," (3) "transfer circuitry," and (4) "a calibration system."
Level of ordinary skill in the art
The level of ordinary skill is not argued, so we find the references to be representative of the level
of skill in the art. See In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91, 198 USPQ 210, 214 (CCPA 1978) ("the PTO
usually must evaluate both the scope and content of the prior art and the level of ordinary skill solely on the
cold words of the literature"); In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579, 35 USPQ2d 1116, 1121 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (the Board did not err in adopting the approach that the level of skill in the art was best determined
by the references of record). Cf. Chore-Time Equipment Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 779
n.2, 218 USPQ 673, 676 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("We hold only that an invention may be held to have been
either obvious (or nonobvious) without a specific finding of a particular level of skill . . . where, as here, the
prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for such expert testimony has not been shown.").
Those of ordinary skill in the art must also be presumed to know something about the art apart from what
the references expressly disclose. In re Jacoby, 309 F.2d 513, 516, 135 USPQ 317, 319 (CCPA 1962).
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