Appeal No. 96-0978
Application 08/110,324
determination of whether the claims of an application satisfy the
requirements of the second paragraph of Section 112 is
merely to determine whether the claims do, in fact, set
out and circumscribe a particular area with a
reasonable degree of precision and particularity. It
is here where the definiteness of language employed
must be analyzed -- not in a vacuum, but always in
light of the teachings of the prior art and of the
particular application disclosure as it would be
interpreted by one possessing the ordinary level of
skill in the pertinent art. [Emphasis ours; footnote
omitted.]
Here, we do not believe that it can seriously be contended that,
consistent with the appellants’ specification, one of ordinary
skill in this art would not understand that the feed slurry
passageway has both a leading edge and a trailing edge in the
direction of rotation of the conveyor hub. Accordingly, we will
not sustain the rejection of claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
second paragraph.
Turning to the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
as being clearly anticipated by Lavanchy, we initially note that
the terminology in a pending application's claims is to be given
its broadest reasonable interpretation (In re Zletz, 893 F.2d
319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989)) and limitations
from a pending application's specification will not be read into
the claims (Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 1573, 1581-82, 6 USPQ2d
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