Appeal No. 95-4237
Application 07/887,002
differences in operation between Lurz’s device and appellants’
disclosed device, these alleged differences are not reflected
in claim language appellants have chosen to use. The law of
anticipation does not require that the reference teach
specifically what an appellant has disclosed and is claiming
but only that the claims on appeal “read on” something
disclosed in the reference, i.e., all limitations of the claim
are found in the reference. See Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 772, 218 USPQ 781, 789 (Fed. Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984), (and overruled in part on
another issue) 775 F.2d 1107, 227 USPQ 577 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
This is the case here with respect to the Lurz reference, in
our view.
We will also sustain the examiner’s § 102 rejection of
claim 3 based on Lurz since appellants state (brief, page 4)
that this claim will stand or fall with base claim 1. In
addition, we will sustain the examiner’s § 102 rejection of
claim 2 based on Lurz since appellants have not argued this
dependent claim with any reasonable degree of specificity
apart from claim 1. See, for example, In re Nielson, 816 F.2d
-13-
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