Appeal No. 97-3110
Application 08/437,956
1863, 1870 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In short, appellant may not after
the fact attempt to draw a distinction between the claim
language and the ordinary meaning of that language when the
distinction was not previously set forth in the specification.
Furthermore, a definition in the specification which distorts
the common meaning of a term or phrase is not permissible and
renders the claim in which that term or phrase appears
indefinite. In re Barr, 444 F.2d at 597, 170 USPQ at 338.
For the foregoing reasons, we will sustain the examiner’s
rejection of claims 1 through 21 under the second paragraph of
§ 112.
Since no reasonably definite meaning can be ascribed to
the indefinite claim language discussed supra, we cannot
compare the subject matter of claims 1 through 7, 11, 12, and
17 through 20 with the prior art applied in the § 103
rejection without resorting to speculation and conjecture. We
are therefore constrained to reverse the § 103 rejection of
these claims in light of the holdings in In re Steele, 305
F.2d 859, 863, 134 USPQ 292, 295 (CCPA 1962) and In re Wilson,
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