Ex parte CANNON et al. - Page 3




              Appeal No. 1997-1012                                                                                       
              Application No. 08/115,937                                                                                 


                     Claims 1, 3, 4, 8, 11, 13, 14, 18, 21-22, 24 and 28 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §                
              103 as being unpatentable over Kawai in view of Strong and Cannon.  Claims 10, 20 and                      
              30 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Kawai, Strong and                       
              Cannon in view of Katz.                                                                                    
                     Rather than reiterate the conflicting viewpoints advanced by the Examiner and the                   
              appellants regarding the above-noted rejections, we make reference to the Examiner's                       
              answer (Paper No. 16, mailed April 25, 1996) for the Examiner's complete reasoning in                      
              support of the rejections, and to the appellants’ brief (Paper No. 14, filed February 29,                  
              1996) for the appellants’ arguments thereagainst.                                                          
                                                       OPINION                                                           

                     In reaching our decision in this appeal, we have given careful consideration to the                 
              appellants’ specification and claims, to the applied prior art references, and to the                      
              respective positions articulated by the appellants and the Examiner.  As a consequence of                  
              our review, we make the determinations which follow.                                                       
                     Assuming arguendo that the combination is proper, we do find that the Examiner                      
              has not set forth a prima facie case of obviousness.  The Examiner has set forth that                      
              the prior art applied against the claims teaches the claim limitation with respect to the                  
              “thesaurus means for expanding the list of search descriptors by including equivalent                      
              words for the search descriptors.”  The Examiner argues that Strong teaches this claim                     


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