Appeal No. 97-3749
Application 08/360,069
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is incumbent upon the examiner to
establish a factual basis to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. See In re Fine,
837 F.2d 1071, 1073, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In so doing, the examiner
is expected to make the factual determinations set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 17, 148 USPQ 459, 467 (1966), and to provide a reason why one having ordinary
skill in the pertinent art would have been led to modify the prior art or to combine prior art
references to arrive at the claimed invention. Such reason must stem from some teaching,
suggestion or implication in the prior art as a whole or knowledge generally available to
one having ordinary skill in the art. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044,
1051, 5 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988); Ashland Oil,
Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc.,
776 F.2d 281, 293, 227 USPQ 657, 664 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017
(1986); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp., 732 F.2d 1572, 1577, 221 USPQ 929,
933 (Fed. Cir. 1984). These showings by the examiner are an essential part of complying
with the burden of presenting a prima facie case of obviousness. Note In re Oetiker, 977
F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
We consider first the rejection of claims 1-8 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Hirai in view of Jamzadeh and Yip. With respect to independent claim 1, the
examiner has referred to Hirai as the primary reference and has indicated which features
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