Appeal No. 1997-1984
Application 08/408,127
56) means that firmware performs a reboot. Instead, we find that Farrand simply uses firmware to
control error reporting, which is a type of alert determination function. Because claims 3 to 6 on appeal
all require that a firmware mechanism (claims 3 to 5) or an operating system (claim 6) resident in the
computer
system attempt the reboot using a firmware routine, we cannot sustain the examiner’s rejection of these
claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
We also agree with appellants’ argument (Brief, page 8) that in Farrand the reboot is
performed in response to, or after, the error reporting. The examiner admits that in Farrand, "[n]ot
explicitly disclosed is the step of the firmware mechanism attempting to reboot the system before
reporting the error" (final Office action, page 3) (emphasis added). We are not persuaded by the
examiner’s assertion that to reboot the computer system before reporting errors to the remote site
would have been obvious in order to resolve problems locally so that the remote would not need to be
contacted unless local reboot failed (final Office action, page 3; Answer, page 4). The examiner has
provided no reference teaching or suggestion for such a proposition. Accordingly, we find that the
examiner has failed to show that the collective teachings and/or suggestions of Farrand would have
taught or suggested attempting to reboot before reporting an error as claimed in claims 3 to 6 on
appeal.
5
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Next
Last modified: November 3, 2007