Ex parte URRY - Page 5


                  Appeal No.  1999-0623                                                                                    
                  Application No.  08/316,802                                                                              
                  THE REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 112, SECOND PARAGRAPH:                                                   
                  Claims 4-8, 10-16, 18-23, 26 and 28-38:                                                                  
                         The examiner refers (Answer, page 4) to the Final Rejection8 and states that                      

                  “the state of the art is such that the [sic] undue experimentation would be required by                  
                  the public.”  The Final Rejection states (pages 2-3) that “hydrophobic amino acid                        
                  and glycine residues is vague; what positions and which hydrophobic amino acids?                         
                  … Given that there are at least 4 hydrophobic naturally occurring amino acids, the                       
                  number of permutations for the nanomer containing one glycine will be 48.1 =                             
                  65,536.  That is, an experimenter would have to construct 65,536 nanomers [sic]                          
                  determine which nanomers form the beta turn.  The examiner submits that this effort                      
                  constitutes too much experimentation.”                                                                   
                         The examiner did not use the correct legal standard to reach the conclusion                       
                  that the claims are indefinite.  The examiner’s concerns regarding the amount of                         
                  experimentation bespeaks more of a 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, enablement                          
                  issue rather than one of indefiniteness under the second paragraph.  However, here                       
                  the examiner makes no mention of the first paragraph of section 112.  Instead, the                       
                  examiner bases his rejection on the second paragraph of section 112.  We also                            
                  note appellant’s recognition (Brief, page 10, n. 4) that the statutory basis for this                    
                  rejection is unclear.  As set forth in In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235, 169 USPQ                        
                  236, 238 (CCPA 1971), claim language must be analyzed “not in a vacuum, but                              
                  always in light of the teachings of the prior art and of the particular application                      

                                                                                                                           
                  8 Paper No. 44, mailed September 16, 1997.                                                               

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