Appeal No. 1999-1169 Application No. 08/442,441 Therefore, the prior art rejection must fall because it is necessarily based on speculative assumption as to the meaning of the claims. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862-63, 134 USPQ 292, 295 (CCPA 1962). It should be understood, however, that our decision in this regard is based solely on the indefiniteness of the claimed subject matter, and does not reflect on the adequacy of the prior art evidence applied in support of the rejection. NEW REJECTION Claims 2 through 21 and 36 through 57 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter the appellants regard as the invention. The second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires claims to set out and circumscribe a particular area with a reasonable degree of precision and particularity. In re Johnson, 558 F.2d 1008, 1015, 194 USPQ 187, 193 (CCPA 1977). In determining whether this standard is met, the definiteness of the language employed in the claims must be analyzed, not in a vacuum, but always in light of the teachings of the prior art and of the particular application disclosure as it would 4Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007