Appeal No. 96-3533
Application 08/203,624
Thus, we arrive at the point where our interpretation of claim 1 differs from that apparently
urged by appellants. The ordinary meaning of “matrix” is “A . . . surrounding substance within which
something originates, develops or is contained.” See, e.g., The American Heritage Dictionary
Second College Addition 772-73 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982). We have found no
ordinary definition of the term “matrix” which requires that the “surrounding substance” must necessarily
be a solid. The interpretation apparently urged by appellants is that the resin would form a solid
“matrix,” but they have not pointed to the basis in the specification as it would be interpreted by one of
ordinary skill in the art or elsewhere for their interpretation.
Therefore, on this record, we find it reasonable to interpret the claim phrase “fibers are
uniformly dispersed in the resin” to encompass fibers uniformly dispersed in a resin matrix wherein the
resin surrounding the fibers is in particulate form. Indeed, such a mixture of fibers uniformly dispersed in
a matrix of particulate resin would form a coating or sheet in which the fibers would be randomly
oriented in the manner required for “successful utilization of artificial dielectric coatings” as stated in
appellants’ specification (page 3), and, in our view, as shown by Gamble (e.g., col. 2, line 64, to col. 3,
line 7, col. 6, line 60, to col. 7, line 5, and Example 1). We are not persuaded otherwise by the use of
water by Gamble to disperse the fibers in a resin matrix. Indeed, as we noted above, we interpreted the
claimed phrase “coating material comprising fibers and resin” in our original opinion to further comprise
any material “which would facilitate or otherwise affect the uniform distribution of any fiber in the resin.”
This would include water.
Accordingly, because appellants have not established that, on this record, our interpretation of
the claim terms of claim 1 is unreasonable, Morris, supra, we decline to reverse our affirmance of the
examiner’s ground of rejection.
We have granted appellant's request to the extent that we have reconsidered our decision of
February 29, 2000, but we deny the request with respect to making any changes therein.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended
under 37 CFR § 1.136(a).
DENIED
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