Ex parte RESCH et al. - Page 4


                    Appeal No. 2001-0515                                                                                                   
                    Application 08/926,358                                                                                                 


                    1 gives “life and meaning” to the claim and therefore constitutes a positive limitation that must be                   

                    considered in determining the patentability of the claimed subject matter.                                             

                                The test for determining whether or not the preamble of a claim may be deemed to                           

                    be a limitation of the claim is whether the preamble gives “life and meaning” to the claim.  See,                      

                    Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A. Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257, 9 USPQ2d                                       

                    1962, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  See also In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479, 31 USPQ2d                                    

                    1671, 1673 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Terms appearing in a preamble may be deemed limitations of a                              

                    claim when they give meaning to the claim and properly define the invention.).                                         

                                In the present case, the preambular recitation of the prosthetic glenoid component in                      

                    claim 1 imports into the claim that the laterally facing concave surface is capable of receiving and                   

                    articulating the humerus. Lippincott’s prosthetic component obviously lacks such a capability.                         

                    We, therefore, agree with appellants that the preamble of appealed claim 1 gives “life and                             

                    meaning” to the claim and thus provides a limitation that cannot be dismissed as a statement of                        

                    intended use.  For this reason alone, we cannot agree that claims 1, 6 and 7 are anticipated by                        

                    Lippincott since the absence from the reference of any element of a claim negates anticipation of                      

                    that claim by the reference. See Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565,                               

                    1571, 230 USPQ 81, 84 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987).                                            

                                With regard to the § 102(b) rejection of claims 1 and 4 based on Rambert, we                               

                    agree with the examiner that the projection 21 shown in Figure 1 of the Rambert reference                              

                    resembles a keel.  However, Rambert discloses that the glenoid component has two of those                              

                    projections, not one.  See page 13 of the accompanying translation of the Rambert                                      


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