PACHOLOK V. HUTMACHER et al. - Page 9



               Interference No. 103,830                                                                                              


               because a discharge caused a mechanical failure stemming from the overheating and cracking of                         
               one or more parts.                                                                                                    
               Pacholok’s Diligence                                                                                                  
                       The junior party contends it was diligent in the period from just prior to Hutmacher’s                        
               entry into the field on  July 11, 1994 to its filing date on January 3, 1995.                                         
                       A party that seeks to establish reasonable diligence must account for the entire period                       
               during which diligence is required; that period commences from a time just prior to the senior                        
               party’s date to the junior party’s reduction to practice, either actual or constructive.  Gould v.                    
               Schawlow, 363 F.2d 908, 919, 150 USPQ 634, 643 (CCPA 1966).  Public policy favors early                               
               disclosure.  Naber v. Cricchi, 567 F.2d 382, 385, n.5, 196 USPQ 294, 297, n.5 (CCPA 1977),                            
               cert. denied, 439 U.S. 826, 200 USPQ 64 (1978).  During this period there must be “reasonably                         
               continuous activity.”  Burns v. Curtis, 172 F.2d 588, 591, 80 USPQ 587, 588-589 (CCPA 1949).                          
               Evidence which is of a general nature to the effect that work was continuous and which has little                     
               specificity as to dates and facts does not constitute the kind of evidence required to establish                      
               diligence in the critical period.  Kendall v. Searles, 173 F.2d 986, 992-93, 81 USPQ 363, 368                         
               (CCPA 1949).                                                                                                          
                       We hold that Pacholok has not established reasonable diligence in the critical period.                        
               The only evidence tending to corroborate the inventor’s testimony with respect to diligence are                       
               the documents identified as B60-B69.  Exhibit B60 is dated January 4, 1994 and is well outside                        
               the period with which we are concerned.  Exhibits B61-69 cover the period October 27, 1994 to                         
               December 2, 1994.  Even assuming that the above exhibits establish diligence between                                  




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