Ex Parte PUCKETT et al - Page 6


               Appeal No. 1997-3096                                                                                                   
               Application 08/391,407                                                                                                 

               filled with about 50% to about 95% inorganic filler.”5  Thus, each of claims 16, 31 and 32 define                      
               a deflector in one set of terms regarding the two dimensional shape thereof and in another set of                      
               terms regarding the elastomeric material of which it is made.                                                          
                       With respect to the shape and dimensions of the claimed “flat and flexible material” or                        
               “sheet of material” articles, we find from the record on appeal that while the terms “deflector for                    
               application to the inner panel of a vehicle” with respect to the “intrusion of water and sound” or                     
               “attenuate sound” “past said vehicle panel” or “through an opening,” and the requirements that                         
               “the flat and flexible material” or “sheet of material” must have “a peripheral shape generally                        
               matching the peripheral configuration of the inner panel” constitute an intended purpose or use                        
               for the articles, as the examiner points out (answer, page 6), the terms must nonetheless be given                     
               weight with respect to the two dimensional shape of the claimed article in order to give meaning                       
               to the claims and properly define the invention.  See generally, Corning Glass Works; cf. Loctite                      
               Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 868, 228 USPQ 90, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1985), overruled on                            
               other grounds, Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, 141 F.3d 1059, 1068, 46 USPQ2d 1097,                             
               1104 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (The claim language “adapted to remain in a liquid, nonpolymerizing state                        
               for prolonged periods of time while in contact with air and to polymerize to the solid state in the                    
               absence of air and upon contact with metal surfaces . . .” was interpreted by the court “as merely                     
               language of intended use, not a claim limitation. [Citation omitted.]”).                                               
                       However, with respect to appellants’ argument that the cited language of claims 16, 31                         

                                                                                                                                     
               5  We note that claim 31 provides in part that “said material comprises a thermoplastic elastomer                      
               substantially filled with an inorganic filler” while claim 32, dependent on claim 31, provides in                      
               part that “said inorganic filler further comprises a thermoplastic elastomer substantially filled                      
               with from about 50% to about 95% of an inorganic filler.” It is readily apparent that the cited                        
               phrase in claim 32 is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, in defining “an                              
               inorganic filler” as comprising the organic “thermoplastic elastomer” which further contains an                        
               inorganic filler. In order to avoid piecemeal appellate review, we find that a reasonable,                             
               conditional interpretation of claim 32 based on the specification (e.g., pages 4-5) that is adequate                   
               for purposes of resolving prior art issues can be made without unsupported speculative                                 
               assumptions, and thus, for purposes of this appeal, we have arrived at this interpretation. Cf. In re                  
               Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862-63, 134 USPQ 292, 295 (CCPA 1962); Ex parte Saceman, 27 USPQ2d                               
               1472, 1474 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1993).  However, while we have so considered claim 32, the                            
               matter of whether this claims complies with § 112, second paragraph, should be addressed by the                        
               examiner upon any further consideration of claim 32 subsequent to this appeal.                                         

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