Ex parte CULLEN et al. - Page 2


                Appeal No. 1999-1244                                                                                                            
                Application 08/453,003                                                                                                          

                carried out and would have a reasonable likelihood of success viewed in light of the prior art. [Citations                      
                omitted] Both the suggestion and the expectation of success must be founded in the prior art, not in the                        
                applicant’s disclosure.”  In re Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 469, 473, 5 USPQ2d 1529, 1531 (Fed.                                     
                Cir. 1988).  Thus, a prima facie case of obviousness is established by showing that some objective                              
                teaching, suggestion or motivation in the applied prior art taken as a whole and/or knowledge generally                         
                available to one of ordinary skill in the art would have led that person to the claimed invention as a                          
                whole, including each and every limitation of the claims, without recourse to the teachings in appellants’                      
                disclosure.  See generally, In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1358, 47 USPQ2d 1453, 1458 (Fed. Cir.                                 
                1998);          Pro-Mold and Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1573, 37                                      
                USPQ2d 1626, 1629-30 (Fed. Cir. 1996); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Sys. Corp., 72                                     
                F.3d 1577, 1582, 37 USPQ2d 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“When obviousness is based on a                                         
                particular prior art reference, there must be a showing of a suggestion or motivation to modify the                             
                teachings of that reference. [Citation omitted.] This suggestion or motivation need not be expressly                            
                stated. [Citation omitted.]”); In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1074-76, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598-1600                                     
                (Fed. Cir. 1988); Dow Chem., 837 F.2d at 473, 5 USPQ2d at 1531-32.                                                              
                         We find that, when considered in light of the written description in the specification as                              
                interpreted by one of ordinary skill in this art, see, e.g., In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054-55,    44                        
                USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997), the plain language of appealed claim 14 requires in step “(d)                               
                ceasing said oxidation when the concentration of oxygen in said gaseous reaction products increases at                          
                a predetermined rate,” which “gaseous reaction products” are vented from the vessel in step (c).  We                            
                have carefully compared this requirement of the claimed process with the disclosure of Hershmann                                
                Example 4 as explained by the examiner and in light of appellants’ arguments.  While we agree with the                          
                examiner that the samples taken every half hour from the autoclave would have been analyzed to                                  
                monitor the course of the reaction, we find no teaching within this reference which would have led one                          
                of ordinary skill in this art to modify the process of the reference by monitoring the reaction gases and                       
                using that information in the manner required by the claims, and the examiner has not established that                          
                knowledge in the art would have provided such a suggestion.  Accordingly, we cannot subscribe to the                            
                examiner’s reasoning and thus must reverse the rejection.                                                                       

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