Ex parte SIMONSON et al. - Page 2


                Appeal No. 1997-4399                                                                                                     
                Application 08/505,338                                                                                                   

                        It is well settled that “[t]he consistent criterion for determination of obviousness is whether the              
                prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art that [the claimed process] should be                  
                carried out and would have a reasonable likelihood of success, viewed in the light of the prior art.                     
                [Citations omitted] Both the suggestion and the expectation of success must be founded in the prior art,                 
                not in the applicant’s disclosure.”  In re Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 469, 473, 5 USPQ2d 1529, 1531                         
                (Fed. Cir. 1988).  Thus, a prima facie case of obviousness is established by showing that some                           
                objective teaching, suggestion or motivation in the applied prior art taken as a whole and/or knowledge                  
                generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art would have led that person to the claimed invention              
                as a whole, including each and every limitation of the claims, without recourse to the teachings in                      
                appellants’ disclosure.  See generally, In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1358, 47 USPQ2d 1453, 1458                         
                (Fed. Cir. 1998);         Pro-Mold and Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1573,                        
                37 USPQ2d 1626, 1629-30 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447-48, 24 USPQ2d                               
                1443, 1446-47 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Nies, J., concurring); In re Laskowski, 871 F.2d 115, 10 USPQ2d                          
                1397 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1074-76, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598-1600 (Fed.                                
                Cir. 1988).  We agree with appellants that the examiner has failed to carry his burden of making out a                   
                prima facie case of obviousness with respect to the claimed invention.                                                   
                        We find that the process for the selective removal of hydrogen sulphide from gas containing                      
                hydrogen and carbon dioxide by absorption in carbonate-containing alkaline solutions is specified in                     
                appealed claim 1 to “multiple stages of circulating carbonate-containing alkaline solutions” and                         
                “adjusting the pH in each stage . . . to about 9-12 by the addition of a hydroxide” to obtain a “total                   
                sulphide content exceeding about 0.30 mole/l in the outgoing solution.”  Thus, the claim requires at least               
                that the hydrogen sulphide must be recovered as a sulphide.                                                              
                        We find that Murray discloses that the prior art process of merely absorbing hydrogen sulphide                   
                in an alkaline solution from a gas containing the sulphide and carbon dioxide is inefficient (col. 2, lines              
                19-33).  Murray teaches that the absorption of hydrogen sulfide by maintaining the aqueous alkaline                      
                solution, which contains sodium ions and preferably carbonate ions, at a pH of about 9.0 and above so                    
                                                                                                                                              
                3  The examiner withdrew the ground of rejection of claims 1 through 8 and 11 under § 103 as being                       


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