Ex Parte SKI-HSIANG et al - Page 2


                 Appeal No.  2001-1900                                                           Page 2                   
                 Application No.  08/981,700                                                                              

                                              GROUND OF REJECTION                                                         
                         Claims 1, 13, 37, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as                              
                 anticipated by Shuji.                                                                                    
                         We reverse.                                                                                      
                                                     DISCUSSION                                                           
                         On this record, the examiner finds (Answer, page 4), as set forth at page                        
                 19 of appellants’ specification, that the “instant invention does not bind the                           
                 chimeric peptide C7 as well as the prior art [G1] receptor does….”  While the                            
                 examiner agrees (Answer, page 6) that the claimed receptor subtype is different                          
                 than the prior art receptor, the examiner maintains (Answer, page 3) that the                            
                 transitional phrase “consisting essentially of” broadens the scope of the claimed                        
                 receptor to encompass all galanin receptor subtypes as long as enough                                    
                 sequence identity is retained to classify the resulting receptor as a galanin                            
                 receptor.  We cannot agree with the examiner’s position.                                                 
                         In contrast to the examiner’s interpretation of the transitional phrase                          
                 “consisting essentially of,” the court in In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 551-552,                             
                 190 USPQ 461, 463 (CCPA 1976) explains:                                                                  
                                In In re Janakirama-Rao, [317 F.2d 951, 137 USPQ 893                                      
                         (CCPA 1963)] … this court held that the phrase “consisting                                       
                         essentially of” limits the scope of a claim to the specified                                     
                         ingredients and those that do not materially affect the basic and                                
                         novel characteristic(s) of a composition.  It cited Ex parte Davis, 80                           
                         USPQ 448 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1948), … and quoted approvingly                                     
                         the following portion of the opinion:                                                            
                                       In the present case where the claims recite three                                  
                                ingredients and the reference discloses four, the important                               
                                question is whether the term “consisting essentially of”                                  
                                excludes that fourth ingredient.  We think that it does, since                            






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