Interference No. 103,635
761, 28 USPQ at 385. Accordingly, we are left only with the "pressure" to file. That alone
does not establish attorney diligence.
"The standards for finding reasonable diligence are harsh. The public policy favors
early disclosure, Honeywell Inc. v. Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks,
208 USPQ 452 (D.D.C. 1980); Young v. Dworkin, 489 F.2d 1277, 1279-81, 180 USPQ
388, 390-392 (C.C.P.A. 1974), and thus the law is reluctant to displace an inventor who
was the first to disclose to the public his invention, Naber v. Cricchi, 567 F.2d 382, 385-86
& n.5, 196 USPQ 294 , 296-298 & n.5 (C.C.P.A. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829, 200
USPQ 64 (1978)." Liang v. Borger, 214 USPQ 368, 372-373 (Bd. Pat. Int. 1981).
After careful review of the facts in this case, we conclude that only activities directly solely
to the exploitation of the invention were conducted in the U.S. and, as such, are not directly
related to reduction to practice of the subject matter of the count. Accordingly, we find that
Scott has not met its burden of establishing reasonable diligence from a point just prior to
Koyama's entry into the field (i.e., March 13, 1990) until Scott's constructive reduction to
practice (i.e., March 29, 1990).
Prior Conception With Reasonable Diligence Up To Actual Reduction to Practice
In the second line of argument, Scott contends that they have demonstrated prior
conception with reasonable diligence from just before Koyama's entry into the field (i.e.,
March 13, 1990) up to actual reduction to practice.
of the instant invention." Burns v. Curtis, 172 F.2d 588, 591, 80 USPQ 587, 589 (CCPA 1949).
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