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               to allow a party to modify its preliminary statement when the count is modified, in the present                        
               situation the filing of a modified preliminary statement by Glaxo is not necessary.  Since the                         
               subject matter of Count 2 is encompassed by the subject matter of Count 1, we see no reason                            
               why Glaxo’s alleged dates would be any earlier for the subject matter of Count 2 than they are                         
               for the subject matter of Count 1.                                                                                     
                       In Glaxo preliminary motion 5, Glaxo argues that Cabilly should not be accorded priority                       
               benefit of the ‘419 application, filed 10 June 1988, for the subject matter of Count 2.  In                            
               particular, Cabilly argues that the ‘419 application does not provide written description as                           
               required by 35 USC § 112, ¶ 1, for an embodiment within the scope of Count 2.  In Glaxo                                
               preliminary motion 3, Glaxo moves under 37 CFR § 1.633(a) for judgment that the involved                               
               Cabilly claims are unpatentable for failure to comply with the written description requirement of                      
               35 USC § 112, ¶ 1.                                                                                                     
                       Glaxo acknowledges that Cabilly’s involved application and the ‘419 application are                            
               “identical” (Paper 203 at 14) and that Glaxo’s arguments in its preliminary motion 3 are                               
               substantially the same as its arguments that the ‘419 application fails to provide written                             
               description for an embodiment of the Count17 (Paper 203 at 15).                                                        
                       The written description required for patentability differs from that required for priority.                    
               Priority is not a basis for granting a patent to a party; rather, it is the basis for denying                          
               patentability to another party under 35 U.S.C. 102(g)(1). Cromlish v. D.Y., 57 USPQ2d 1318,                            
               1319 (BPAI (ITS) 2000). Thus, a single described and enabled embodiment within the scope of                            


                       17      While counsel for Glaxo appeared to be referring to Count 1, we note that Glaxo’s                      
               arguments that the ‘419 application lacks written description for an embodiment within the scope                       
               of the count appear to be substantially the same whether the count is Count 1 or Count 2.                              
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