board despite the fact Morrison had every opportunity to do so.
Cf. Revson v. Cinque & Cinque, P.C., 221 F.3d 71, 81-82 (2d Cir.
2000) ("It is well-settled that a party's failure to call a
witness may permissibly support an inference that witness's
testimony would have been adverse. See, e.g., Graves v. United
States, 150 U.S. 118, 121, 14 S. Ct. 40, 37 L.Ed. 1021 (1893)
('if a party has it peculiarly within his power to produce
witnesses whose testimony would elucidate the transaction, the
fact that he does not do it creates the presumption that the
testimony, if produced, would be unfavorable')"). According to
Morrison, "the facts presented here are insufficient to raise any
inference of *** suppression or concealment" (Paper 51, page 9).
Morrison's argument rings hollow, however, because Morrison has
not told us where we are to find the evidence which would make
out a factual case for overcoming an inference of intent to
suppress or conceal. Thus, we lack substantial evidence upon
which to make findings which Morrison apparently would have us
make.
c.
We agree with Morrison that there is no per se rule on
whether a delay of a particular time period is "unreasonable"
(Paper 48, page 35). We can also agree that there is no "smoking
gun" that Morrison intended to suppress or conceal (Paper 48,
page 35). However, the 21-month, 11-day period in this case,
where no meaningful evidence has been called to our attention of
activity leading to the filing of a patent application, raises an
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