Appeal No. 2002-0249 Application No. 09/321,390 Accordingly, we affirm only those Section 103 rejections for substantially the reasons set forth in the Answer and below. 35 U.S.C. § 112, Second Paragraph As the court stated in In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235, 169 USPQ 236, 238 (CCPA 1971), the determination of whether the claims of an application satisfy the requirements of the second paragraph of Section 112 is merely to determine whether the claims do, in fact, set out and circumscribe a particular area with a reasonable degree of precision and particularity. It is here where the definiteness of language employed must be analyzed -- not in a vacuum, but always in light of the teachings of the prior art and of the particular application disclosure as it would be interpreted by one possessing the ordinary level of skill in the pertinent art. [Emphasis ours; footnote omitted.] The purpose of the second paragraph of Section 112 is to basically insure, with a reasonable degree of particularity, an adequate notification of the metes and bounds of what is being claimed. See In re Hammack, 427 F.2d 1378, 1382, 166 USPQ 204, 208 (CCPA 1970). Here, the examiner criticizes the use of the terminology “the fuel gas” and “the processed fuel gas stream,” but does not explain why one of ordinary skill in the art would not understand 6Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007