Ex Parte BURGESS - Page 3




            Appeal No. 2002-1080                                                               3              
            Application No. 09/372,149                                                                        


            Claims 1, 8, and 19                                                                               
                   McCarthy, the primary reference in each of the examiner’s rejections, is directed          
            to a lightweight shoe that is adapted to be secured to the foot without any straps, laces,        
            or other additional fastening elements, such as uppers which exert pressure on the                
            upper part of the foot (column 1, lines 15-21).  To this end, McCarthy utilizes “a                
            conventional complete shoe bottom, comprising an outer wearing surface and an inner               
            smooth foot supporting surface, with a layer of pressure sensitive adhesive, on the               
            inner smooth foot-supporting surface to adhere the shoe bottom to the foot” (column 2,            
            lines 5-10).  McCarthy indicates that the shoe bottom 10 may be made of rubber                    
            (column 2, line 14).  McCarthy also indicates that the lightweight shoe may be made               
            from simple sheet material that is disposable as desired (column 4, lines 5-7).                   
                   The examiner’s position to the effect that McCarthy meets all the limitations of           
            claim 1 except for the requirements that the cushion member is of substantially uniform           
            thickness and does not have a thickened heel portion is well founded.  In this regard,            
            McCarthy’s sole 10 is a “cushion member” within the broad meaning of that term.  In               
            proceedings before it, the PTO applies to the verbiage of claims the broadest                     
            reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood               
            by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of         
            definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in             
            appellant’s specification.  In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027               








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