Appeal No. 2002-1444 Page 3 Application No. 09/004,564 respective positions articulated by the appellants and the examiner. As a consequence of our review, we make the determinations which follow. Both of the rejections are under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the prior art would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art. See, e.g., In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425, 208 USPQ 871, 881 (CCPA 1981). In establishing a prima facie case of obviousness, it is incumbent upon the Examiner to provide a reason why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to modify a prior art reference or to combine reference teachings to arrive at the claimed invention. See Ex parte Clapp, 227 USPQ 972, 973 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1985). To this end, the requisite motivation must stem from some teaching, suggestion, or inference in the prior art as a whole or from the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art and not from the appellant’s disclosure. See, e.g., Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1052, 5 USPQ2d 1434, 1439 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988). The first rejection is that claims 7, 8, 13, 14, 20, and 21 are unpatentable over Peterson in view of Heinecke. It is the examiner’s view that Peterson discloses all of the subject matter recited in independent claims 20 and 21 except for the liners comprising “a non-metallic laminate formed by a flexible layer of plastic material” (see Answer, page 3). However, the examiner asserts that Heinecke teaches a non-metallic laminate 32 formed by a flexible layer of plastic material in contact with a gate 36 (seePage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007