Appeal No. 2002-1556
Application 09/409,583
and
[i]n order for a standstill condition to be “due
to the braking action in which the differential between
the first braking pressure and the second braking
pressure has been set,” it is only logical that
differential braking must be initiated before a
standstill condition arises. However, this simply is
not the case in Nell et al.: Nell et al. controls the
brakes only after a standstill condition arises, and as
such, cannot possibly disclose an arrangement that
detects a standstill condition that is “due to the
braking action in which the differential between the
first braking pressure and the second braking pressure
has been set,” as recited in claim 1 [reply brief, page
4].
Although the appellants’ characterization of the Nell
disclosure ostensibly is accurate, the differential braking
action limitations at issue in claims 1 and 18 are broad enough
to read thereon notwithstanding the appellants’ arguments to the
contrary. In essence, these arguments fail at the outset because
they are not based on limitations appearing in the claims (see In
re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 213 USPQ 1 (CCPA 1982)). More
particularly, claims 1 and 18 do not require any sort of EBD
braking action, let alone the detection of a standstill condition
due to EBD braking action. Similarly, these claims do not
require the differential between the first and second braking
pressures to be achieved or initiated prior to or before
standstill. As pointed out by the appellants, the Nell brake
system sets a differential between first and second braking
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