Ex Parte GRIBBLE - Page 4




             Smith Appeal No. 2002-1817                                                         Page 4                
             Application No. 09/432,862                                                                               


                    seal contacts said passageway around the entire perimeter of said                                 
                    closure.                                                                                          
                    The examiner has rejected this claim under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious1                   
             in view of the teachings of Smith and De La Cerda.  Specifically, the examiner has                       
             found that all of the subject matter recited in claim 1 is disclosed or taught by Smith                  
             except for the seal extending around the entire peripheral outer edge of the closure and                 
             the use of insulation in between the panels of the closure.  However, it is the examiner’s               
             view that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to modify the                   
             Smith pet door by providing the claimed seal and insulation in light of the teachings of                 
             De La Cerda, “to provide a more thorough barrier against convective heat loss” (Paper                    
             No. 2, page 3).  The appellant argues in opposition to this conclusion that De La Cerda                  
             does not disclose a sealing weather strip around the entire perimeter of the door and if                 
             such were installed the De La Cerda door would be inoperative, and therefore the only                    
             suggestion for combining the references in the manner proposed by the examiner is                        
             found in the appellant’s own disclosure (Brief, pages 3 and 4).                                          


                    1The test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the prior art would have suggested to 
             one of ordinary skill in the art.  See, for example, In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425, 208 USPQ 871, 881  
             (CCPA 1981).  In establishing a prima facie case of obviousness, it is incumbent upon the examiner to    
             provide a reason why one of ordinary skill in the art would have been led to modify a prior art reference or
             to combine reference teachings to arrive at the claimed invention.  See Ex parte Clapp, 227 USPQ 972,    
             973 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1985).  To this end, the requisite motivation must stem from some teaching,    
             suggestion or inference in the prior art as a whole or from the knowledge generally available to one of  
             ordinary skill in the art and not from the appellant's disclosure.  See, for example, Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-
             Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1052, 5 USPQ2d 1434, 1439 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988).    








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