Appeal No. 2002-2168 Page 6
Application No. 08/961,743
175 F.3d 985, 989, 50 USPQ2d 1607, 1610 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Renishaw PLC v.
Marposs Societa Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249, 48 USPQ2d 1117, 1121 (Fed. Cir.
1998); York Prods., Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1572, 40
USPQ2d 1619, 1622 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). "It is well settled that dictionaries provide
evidence of a claim term's 'ordinary meaning.'" Inverness Med. Switz. GmbH v. Warner
Lambert Co., 309 F.3d 1365, 1369, 64 USPQ2d 1926, 1930 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing
Texas Digital Sys. Inc. v. Telegenix Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202, 64 USPQ2d 1812, 1818
(Fed. Cir. 2002); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366, 62
USPQ2d 1658, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
Here, claims 40-42 specify in pertinent part the following limitations: "the
computing threads are pre-instantiated." Similarly, claims 54, 65, and 76 specify in
pertinent part the following limitations: "the computing threads are pre-instantiated in
the free thread pool." The term "instantiate" is defined as "[t]o make an instance of. .
. ." IBM Dictionary of Computing 345 (1994) (copy attached). Giving the term its
ordinary and accustomed meaning, we conclude that one skilled in the art would
understand that a pre-instantiated thread is thread created to be available for later use.
Therefore, we reverse the indefiniteness rejection of claims 18, 40-42, 49, 54, 60, 65,
71, and 76.
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