Ex Parte JOHNSON - Page 13




                Interference No. 104,316                                                                                                             
                Sauer Inc. v. Kanzaki Kokyukoki Mfg. Co., Ltd.                                                                                       

                        Furthermore, it is also questionable how Sauer can group all "transmissions" together as                                     
               having a "normal" time period for design, construction, and testing. The basis is not articulated.                                    
                Indeed, much depends on the particular features embodied in the specific transmission being                                          

               reduced to practice. An adequate time for one transmission may not be adequate for another                                            
               transmission, and an inadequate time for one transmission may well be adequate for another.                                           
               Sauer's witness, Mr. Staffan Kaempe testifies in his declaration in 114: "Based on my                                                 
               experience as General Manager, I believe that the normal time period that it takes to design,                                         
               build, and test a brand name transmission is at least one year." That testimony is not very                                           
               meaningful since not all brand name transmissions are necessarily of the same level of                                                
               complexity.                                                                                                                           

                        According to Kanzaki, even for times subsequent to February 28, 1988, Sauer has not                                          
               shown reasonable diligence in reducing the invention of the count to practice. However, we need                                       
               not address that issue because even assuming that Sauer was reasonably diligent subsequent to                                         
               February 28, 1988, that diligence did not commence prior to Kanzaki's effective filing date of                                        
               February 3, 1988. At the very most, any diligence on the part of Sauer commenced on February                                          
               29, 1988, and that is not prior to Kanzaki's date of conception as is required by 35 U.S.C.                                           
               § 102(g) for any entitlement by Sauer to priority of invention relative to Kanzaki.                                                   
                        For the foregoing reasons, Sauer has not satisfied its burden of proof in demonstrating                                      
               priority of invention over Kanzaki.                                                                                                   



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