Appeal No. 2002-2071 Application 09/428,451 The appellants argue (request, pages 1-2) that we concluded that “the combined teachings of the references would have fairly suggested the appellants’ claimed invention to one of ordinary skill in the art” (decision, page 5) without referring to or commenting on the appellants’ argument that “[i]n view of the foregoing referred to ... factual evidence, the burden of providing a proper basis for a legal judgment of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) has not been met” (brief, page 5). The “foregoing referred to ... factual evidence” referred to by the appellants is the appellants’ statement regarding what each piece of applied prior art discloses separately (brief, page 4). Our response was as follows (decision, page 5): The appellants argue that none of the admitted prior art, Morishige, Scollard or Gray discloses all elements of the claimed invention (brief, page 4). This argument is not well taken because the appellants are attacking the references individually when the rejection is based on a combination of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426, 208 USPQ 871, 882 (CCPA 1981); In re Young, 403 F.2d 754, 757-58, 159 USPQ 725, 728 (CCPA 1968). As discussed above, the combined teachings of the references would have fairly suggested the appellants’ claimed invention to one of ordinary skill in the art. Thus, we referred to and commented on the appellants’ argument. The appellants do not allege that our response to this argument was in error. 2Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 NextLast modified: November 3, 2007